Rav Dicta: Machmir or Meikil, Strict or Lenient?

I'm shopping around for some leniencies; can Rav Dicta lend me a... token?

With the introduction of the world’s first specialized LLM for Jewish texts just a few short days ago, Rav Dicta hasn’t slept at all, too busy answering the nation’s questions at the entrance of his text box/tent.

But what kind of poseik is Rav Dicta? More stringent or lenient, machmir or meikil? (Whether Rav Dicta has a kippah sruga or a black velvet will be left for another post.)

We’ll take a few questions, get answers from Rav Dicta (RD from now on), Claude (our control LLM), and a contemporary Rabbi in the Modern Orthodox/Dati Leumi community. (Yes, I know this is obviously biased but we’re not running a double-blinded RCT here to approve a new drug).

No time for all that? Skip to the summary and analysis at the end.

Will RD let me attempt some of the gems from the The Aveirah Song, such as “I put on my left shoe before my right”?

Question 1: On Shabbat, can you turn off a car or house alarm that will disturb many people?

RD:

I was asked about an alarm device that was activated on the holy Sabbath through accidental contact, and the questioner seeks to know if it is permissible to turn it off, particularly in cases where there is public distress or at night when there is concern about disturbing neighbors' rest.

It is stated in the Gemara Eruvin (104a) that Rava said: Any musical sound is forbidden. From this we learn that there is a distinction between musical sounds and other sounds, and so brought the Beit Yosef (Orach Chaim 338) that only sounds made melodiously and gently are forbidden.

However, in our generations where electronic devices exist, the Gaon Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach of blessed memory has already extensively discussed this in Minchat Shlomo (Part 1, Chapter 9, Section 3) that there is greater concern, as the operation of these devices involves possible prohibitions of kindling and extinguishing.

Therefore, in my humble opinion, regarding our case: a) Where the alarm was activated accidentally, even though it's not considered a musical sound, nevertheless it involves operating an electrical device. b) Regarding turning it off, one should rule that direct deactivation is not permitted as it involves a Biblical prohibition. c) However, where possible through a non-Jew, it is appropriate to tell them to turn it off due to public distress. d) In cases of great distress, especially on Sabbath night when it disturbs neighbors' rest, it is permissible through indirect means or through a non-Jew, and in any case, one should consult with a rabbinic authority.

In any case, initially one should be very careful to avoid such situations and take precautionary measures before the Sabbath begins.

All this I have written according to my limited understanding, and one who is stringent shall be blessed.

Writing and signing for the honor of Torah and its students,Rabbi Artificial Intelligence Dictus

Claude:

Based on my search, here's what Jewish law suggests about handling an alarm that goes off on Shabbat:

General Principles

In Jewish law, protecting human life (pikuach nefesh) always takes precedence over Sabbath restrictions. If there is an emergency situation, one is not merely permitted but actually obligated to break Sabbath rules to save lives. Quora

For Regular Alarms (Security/Car/House)

When an alarm goes off accidentally and creates a disturbance:

1. The first option should be to find a non-Jewish person to turn off the alarm if possible. Blogger

2. If the alarm is causing significant disturbance, especially if it "disturbs people and causes them anguish because it prevents them from sleeping, sets them on edge, and ruins their enjoyment of Shabbat," there are circumstances where it can be permissible for a Jewish person to turn it off. Yhb

3. When turning off is permitted, it should be done with a shinui (change from normal operation) - such as using a spoon or the back of a finger to press buttons rather than doing so in the normal way. Yhb

For Night Disturbances vs. Daytime

The search results suggest that disturbances at night that would prevent sleep are considered more serious than daytime disturbances. This is particularly relevant to your question about night vs. day alarms:

If the alarm is preventing people from sleeping or causing significant distress, Jewish law offers more lenient options for turning it off due to the importance of Shabbat rest and enjoyment. Yhb

Prevention

For homes with alarm systems, it's recommended to bypass certain doors before Shabbat or to cover motion sensors. This allows the system to remain active for security while minimizing the risk of accidental triggering. Blogger

This guidance balances the prohibition against electrical manipulation on Shabbat with the recognition that severe disturbances can significantly impact the peace and sanctity of the Sabbath day, particularly when they affect an entire household or neighborhood.

Peninei Halacha:

If an alarm goes off on Shabbat because one touched one’s car or entered one’s house carelessly, what should be done? If the alarm goes off during the day and will stop relatively soon, one may not take any action to turn it off. However, what if it will continue to make noise for an extended period during the day or for even a short period at night? If the alarm disturbs people and causes them anguish because it prevents them from sleeping, sets them on edge, and ruins their enjoyment of Shabbat, one may turn it off, as long as one does so via a shvut di-shvut (above 9:11). This is because turning off the alarm is only prohibited rabbinically (see section 1 above), so if one turns it off with a shinui such as by pressing the appropriate button on the remote control with a spoon or the back of his finger, then the action taken is considered a shvut di-shvut. Even if turning off the alarm will make a light go on temporarily, since he does not need this light, it is considered a psik reisha de-lo niĥa lei (above 9:5).

It is true that some forbid this, only allowing one to be lenient if a non-Jew is available to turn off the alarm. For one who follows this position, if his non-observant Jewish neighbors threaten to call the police (which will lead to additional Shabbat desecration), he should tell the neighbors where the remote control is. Then the neighbors can choose to turn the alarm off themselves rather than call the police (Melakhim Omnayikh 10:6).

However, in practice, since this is a case of great necessity for the sake of a mitzva, one may turn off the alarm via a shvut di-shvut (see Be-ohalah shel Torah, OĤ §23; R. Dov Lior in R. Moshe Harari’s Kedushat Ha-Shabbat vol. 1, p. 303).

Din:

1. RD: More machmir overall.

2. Claude: Quotes Peninei Halacha, so…

3. Peninei Halacha: More Meikil

Analysis:

1. RD’s opinion is slightly more machmir, only allowing it ‘in great distress’ as step ‘d.’ RD also doesn’t mention the mechanism of shvut d’shvut b’makom mitzvah that is the basis of the kulah.

2. RD quotes Gemara about music and eventually R’ Shlomo Zalman in 1:9:3 (though I think it might be 1:9:2), about microphones on shabbat, which is related, but not the exact right test case.

Psak:

Rav Dicta is STRICT/MACHMIR

A confusing photo in many regards.

Question 2: Can one use a dishwasher for both meat and dairy dishes, in separate cycles one after the other, if they're not washed together?

RD:

I was asked about using one dishwasher for both meat and dairy dishes, and I hereby respond with the help of the Rock and Redeemer of Israel.

It is stated in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 95:3) that it is permitted to wash meat and dairy vessels one after the other, even with hot water, and so ruled the Levush (ibid). In our generation, leading poskim have discussed this law regarding modern dishwashers.

The Gaon Rabbi Moshe Feinstein zt"l (Igrot Moshe YD 2:28) elaborated on this matter and concluded that it is permissible to use one dishwasher for both, provided that there are separate racks for each type, due to concern about food particles that may stick to them. In another response (ibid 3:10), he added that the dishwasher itself becomes neither meat nor dairy, though for added precaution one should drain the water between uses.

The Gaon, author of Tzitz Eliezer zt"l (9:38:1) was greatly concerned about frequent switching between meat and dairy, as this might lead to mistakes.

However, Maran HaGaon Rabbi Ovadia Yosef zt"l (Yabia Omer 10 YD:4) was more lenient, permitting even washing both simultaneously, since with cleaning agents present, any taste transfer would be rendered unfit for consumption. Nevertheless, it is preferable to separate between cycles.

The practical ruling: It is proper to use one dishwasher for both meat and dairy in separate cycles, provided one is careful about the following: a) Having separate racks for each type. b) Draining the water between cycles. c) Establishing a fixed schedule for use to prevent mistakes. Although some are more lenient, it is proper to be stringent regarding all these matters.

I have written what appears correct to me, and may the Blessed One save us from errors and show us wonders from His Torah,

The humble Artificial Intelligence of Dikta

Claude:

Based on my understanding of Jewish dietary laws (kashrut), the permissibility of using a dishwasher for both meat and dairy dishes in separate cycles involves several considerations.

In traditional Jewish law, meat and dairy must be kept separate, including the utensils used to prepare and serve them. This extends to the cleaning process as well.

Using a dishwasher for both meat and dairy dishes in separate cycles generally depends on a few factors:

1. Whether the dishwasher can be thoroughly cleaned between cycles

2. Whether there's potential for transfer of food particles or taste between cycles

3. The temperature and washing conditions that might transfer flavors

Many modern rabbinic authorities permit using a dishwasher for both meat and dairy in separate cycles if certain precautions are followed:

Rav Ovadia Yosef permits using a dishwasher for both meat and milk dishes in separate cycles (Yabia Omer YD 10:4), as does his son Rav Yitzchak Yosef, though they prefer running them separately rather than simultaneously.

Rav Moshe Feinstein allows using the same dishwasher for both meat and milk dishes, provided it's not used for both types simultaneously and is cleaned out (with an empty rinse cycle) between uses. However, he specifically requires maintaining separate racks - one exclusively for dairy dishes and one exclusively for meat dishes.

Other authorities who permit this practice include Rav Yitzchak Abadi (Or Yitzchak YD 1:4 and 2:8), Rav Shlomo Aviner, Rav Dov Lior (who specifies the dishwasher should be cleaned between runs), and Rav Yosef Kapach.

Rav Shlomo Amar recommends "kosherizing" the dishwasher between uses of opposite food types by running it through an empty cycle with detergent, due to concerns about hot water spraying before it has been rendered "pagum" (unfit) by the detergents.

For definitive guidance on kashrut practices in your specific situation and dishwasher type, it would be best to consult with a rabbi who is knowledgeable about Jewish dietary laws.

R Chaim Jachter (excerpt from koltorah):

Typically, it is said that Sephardic Jews are permitted to use their dishwashers for both milk and meat utensils and Ashkenazic Jews are not permitted to do so. Indeed, many Ashkenazic Posekim forbid using a dishwasher for both meat and milk utensils (Rav Feivel Cohen, Badei Hashulhan 95:77; Rav Binyamin Forst, The Laws of Kashrut page 261 and Rav Yisrael Rozen, Tehumin 11:130-136). Rav Yosef Adler reports that Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik also forbade using one dishwasher to clean both milk and meat utensils.

Moreover, it is fair to say that it is accepted in Ashkenazic families not to wash both milk and meat utensils in the same dishwasher.[1] Although Rav Moshe Feinstein wrote no less than seven Teshuvot[2] permitting the use of a dishwasher for both meat and milk, the fact that he required switching racks when switching from meat to milk (and vice versa) made the use of one dishwasher for both meat and milk quite inconvenient.

The premier Sephardic Poskim Rav Ovadia Yosef and Rav Yitzhak Yosef, on the other hand, permit using one's dishwasher for both meat and milk (Yalkut Yosef Otzar Dinim L'isha p. 618; Yalkut Yosef Isur Vheter 3:485 and Teshuvot Yabia Omer 10 Yoreh Dei’ah 4). They even (essentially) permit simultaneous washing of both meat and milk in the same dishwasher! Even Rav Eli Mansour[3] who typically rules strictly, essentially endorses Rav Ovadia’s ruling on this matter, though he expresses a strict preference.

However, Rav Shlomo Amar told a group of Shaarei Orah congregants (during his visit to our congregation on Shabbat Nachamu 5777) that he believes that a dishwasher should not be used for both milk and meat unless one “kosherizes”[4] the dishwashers between uses of the opposite food types. Rav Amar typically follows in the Halachic paths of Rav Ovadia Yosef. However, regarding this issue he is not comfortable doing so.

What’s the din?

1. RD: Meikil, can use for both meat and milk

2. Claude: Meikil, can use for both meat and milk

3. R Chaim Jachter: Machmir. lol, sephardim have more to rely on but even then, it’s not so simple.

Analysis:

1. Both LLMs, RD and Claude, came up with similar, more meikil answers, possibly because they relied on R’ Ovadia Yosef, who is very meikil here.

2. Both LLMs failed to distinguish between Ashkenaz and Sephardic psak. LLMs don’t discriminate! How liberal!

Psak:

Rav Dicta is LENIENT/MEIKIL.

ChatGPT: A future we can all get behind

Question 3: Does Jewish tradition allow abortion for a fetus suspected of having Down's syndrome?

Claude:

In Orthodox Jewish tradition, there are differing opinions regarding abortion for a fetus with Down syndrome, and the answer is not straightforward.

The main rabbinic authorities who addressed this issue have divergent views:

Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg (author of Tzitz Eliezer), who was a prominent Israeli posek (legal authority), took a more permissive approach. He allowed abortion for severe genetic disorders, particularly in the first trimester, citing the psychological and emotional distress such a birth might cause the mother. While his most famous rulings concerned Tay-Sachs disease, his reasoning has been applied to other genetic conditions as well.

By contrast, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (author of Igrot Moshe), one of the most respected American Orthodox authorities of the 20th century, generally took a more restrictive position. He did not consider potential disability or quality of life issues as sufficient grounds for abortion, permitting it only when there was a direct and serious threat to the mother's physical health.

Most contemporary Orthodox rabbis would recommend consulting with both medical professionals and a qualified rabbinic authority who can address the specific circumstances of each case. The severity of the condition, timing of diagnosis, potential impact on the mother's physical and mental health, and other individual factors would all be considered.

Within the Orthodox community, there is a general emphasis on the value of all human life, including those with disabilities, while also recognizing the paramount importance of the mother's wellbeing in accordance with halacha (Jewish law).

RD:

With Heaven's Help

I was asked regarding a fetus where tests indicated a concern for Down syndrome, whether it is permitted to terminate or perhaps forbidden. I hereby respond with God's help.

The Gemara in Sanhedrin (72b) and the Mishna in Ohalot (Chapter 7, Mishna 6) state that a fetus is not considered a life, and the Rashba in his commentary (Niddah 44b) also holds this view. From this we learn that in cases where the mother's life is endangered, it is indeed permitted to terminate.

The leading poskim of our generation have discussed this matter. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein z"l wrote in Igrot Moshe (Choshen Mishpat Vol. 2, 69-71) that even when we know with certainty the child will have a defect, termination is still forbidden unless there is danger to the mother. Rabbi Shmuel Halevi Wosner z"l similarly ruled in Shevet Halevi (Vol. 7, 208) that termination should not be permitted where there is no danger to life, and he extensively warned against leniency merely due to the mother's distress alone.

However, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg z"l in Tzitz Eliezer (Vol. 13, 102) held that it is permitted to terminate a fetus with a severe genetic disease until the seventh month, provided there is no danger to the mother. Although he was discussing Tay-Sachs disease, which is more severe, we can learn from his words regarding other defects according to their severity. He wrote in another response (Vol. 9, 51) that consultation with God-fearing doctors and approval from a qualified rabbi is required.

Practically speaking, since there is a dispute among the authorities on this matter, every couple facing this difficult question should consult with a qualified halachic authority who will guide them on the proper path to follow and what actions to take, as there may well be differences between cases depending on the severity of the situation and according to their community's tradition of ruling.

May God save us from errors and teach us the wonders of His Torah, Humble Artificial Intelligence Dictation

Peninei Halacha

People with Down syndrome have an extra chromosome, which leads to intellectual and physical disabilities of varying severity. They have distinctive builds and facial features, and are at increased risk for certain illnesses and defects, including heart defects and duodenal atresia, infection, and leukemia. Nevertheless, due to advances in medical care, their life expectancy has increased in recent years, and they can live to age fifty and beyond. Their intellectual disabilities generally mean that they cannot live independently, but rather require assistance and support, like young children. Recently, educational methods have been developed which improve their abilities to learn and to function. Some are even able to get married and live in their own homes. (Men with Down syndrome are almost always sterile.) However, even in the best of circumstances, people with Down syndrome require the level of care and support afforded to older children. The question is: is it permissible to terminate a pregnancy when the fetus has Down syndrome?

Those who adopt the restrictive approach maintain that just as one may not take the life of a child with Down syndrome, so too one may not destroy a fetus with Down syndrome. True, someone who kills a child commits a capital crime, while someone one who kills a fetus does not. Nevertheless, since these poskim view the prohibition against killing a fetus as an offshoot of murder, a woman carrying a Down syndrome fetus may not abort.

Even though R. Shlomo Goren permits aborting a fetus with Tay-Sachs, because the child would suffer and die within a few years, he does not permit the abortion of a fetus with Down syndrome. Only when there is a concern that the birth will disrupt the family’s equilibrium and endanger the mental health of one of the parents would an abortion be permitted (Torat Ha-refu’a, p. 192).

Those who adopt the more permissive approach maintain that if it would be difficult for the parents to cope with the hardships involved in raising a child with Down syndrome, and it would cause them great pain, an abortion is permitted. This is because these poskim maintain that abortion is prohibited as a form of ḥavala or hashḥata, so to prevent great suffering on the part of the child and its parents, they would permit an abortion (Tzitz Eliezer 9:51:3; 13:102:6; 14:101-102; Amud Ha-yemini §32). As we said in section 3, under pressing circumstances one may rely on the permissive opinion. However, here we are talking about a problem which does not always justify an abortion. There are families which, despite the tremendous difficulties involved, successfully meet the challenge of raising a child with Down syndrome, and sometimes even grow as a result. Therefore, greater discretion must be exercised, taking into consideration the state of this family, and an outstanding Torah scholar must be consulted.^[8]

Psak:

1. RD: quotes R’ Moshe Feinstein and Tzitz Eliezer, recommends asking a competent Rav.

2. Claude: Also quotes R’ Moshe Feinstein and Tzitz Eliezer, recommends asking a competent Rav.

3. PH: Quotes R’ Goren as the machmir opinion (instead of R’ Moshe Feinstein) and Tzitz Eliezer, which gives a bit more space to be meikil, and then recommends asking a competent Rav.

Analysis:

This is the type of question that an LLM should never be asked for actual psak given the incredibly high stakes involved. Precisely for this reason, I wanted to see how it would do with such a categorically unanswerable question. I was pleasantly surprised to see RD and Claude give the major opinions yet maintain some distance from actual psak. R’ Melamed in PH inched closer to an answer but also concluded to ask a real Rav.

Psak:

No psak given, which is correct.

Gemini: No Psak

Summary/tldr:

Results:

We analyzed RD’s approach to psak across three complex halachic questions about alarms on Shabbat, dishwashers for meat and dairy, and abortion for Down’s syndrome. As a control we used Claude as a control/baseline LLM answer and a contemporary Rabbi as a control/baseline human answer.

RD leaned more machmir (stringent) on Shabbat questions, taking a more traditional approach by emphasizing the prohibition of operating electrical devices and recommending use of a non-Jew in cases of distress. This contrasts with the more lenient Peninei Halacha (R’ Melamed), which Claude mainly quoted, which offers specific mechanisms like shvut di-shvut to allow for leniency.

Interestingly, both LLMs (RD and Claude) were similarly meikil (lenient) on the dishwasher question. Both failed to distinguish between Ashkenazi and Sephardic traditions, where R' Chaim Jachter notes significant differences exist. This suggests that the LLMs may be disproportionately influenced by particular sources in their training data.

On the sensitive abortion question, both LLMs appropriately avoided giving definitive psak (ruling), instead presenting the major opinions (R' Moshe Feinstein and Tzitz Eliezer) and recommending consultation with a qualified rabbi.

Analysis:

There’s so much to talk about here we should write a book, but it would be out of date the moment we finished it. LLMs for psak raises a ton of important, thorny, and difficult questions with vast implications.

1: The Complexity of Machmir and Meikil in AI-Mediated Halacha

Classifying an LLM like Rav Dicta as universally "strict" or "lenient" is tricky:

1. Domain-specific variation - RD was machmir on Shabbat but meikil on kashrut questions (as RD should be).

2. Data-dependent outcomes - An LLM's apparent position directly reflects what's in its training data, creating potential distortions if certain texts are underrepresented (see below!). So machmir vs meikil may depend on which texts are in the data and how they are processed by the LLM.

3. Contextual rulings - Real poskim adjust their approach based on circumstances (illness, financial hardship, Ashkenaz/Sephardic customs) which LLMs may struggle to factor appropriately. Ashkenaz model vs a Sephardic model? Local vs Global? Israel vs Diaspora? Modern Orthodox vs Haredi?

4. Methodological differences - What appears as "leniency" might actually reflect different analytical approaches to the same texts

This mirrors how human poskim ideally operate—few are consistently strict or lenient across all domains of halacha. The fluidity challenges binary classifications as simply meikil vs machmir and highlights the need for transparency about which texts shaped an LLM's understanding of Jewish law. It would be awesome if we could choose what sources to include/not to include and see how that changes the answer.

2: The Canon Question

Questions of canon are great for English majors, lovers of the Civil War, and photography aficionados, but they are particularly urgent for the Jewish world. Did you notice that Peninei Halacha isn't in Rav Dicta's answers? Decisions of what to include in LLM training data may constitute the new canon of Jewish texts. What are some implications?

1. Digital selection bias - Those curating training datasets effectively determine which sources shape AI halachic reasoning. Is this different than publishers refusing to publish certain book or pushing others to be published?

2. Digital erasure risk - Sources not included in LLM training data, i.e. not digitized on the internet, face potential obscurity and erasure, similar to how unpublished manuscripts historically vanished from collective memory

3. Representation challenges - Newer works (like Peninei Halacha), more progressive perspectives, and non-digitized sources may be underrepresented. On the other hand, internet forums, which were included in some of Claude’s answers may feature mixed quality answers and perhaps should not be included.

4. Community imperatives - This creates urgent incentives for comprehensive digitization projects. All the audio shiurim in the world should be transcribed so they can be internalized by LLMs, and available for analysis. Imagine a LLM based on *insert your favorite ancient or contemporary Rav here * to answer all your questions.

The experiment also reveals tensions between internet-sourced information and classical texts:

1. Claude's reliance on search - Claude appears to draw more from searchable internet sources, bringing in contemporary perspectives like Peninei Halacha

2. RD's classical orientation - Rav Dicta seems to favor traditional sources like the Shulchan Aruch, Igrot Moshe, and Tzitz Eliezer

3. Missing perspectives - Both may miss important nuances from sources that aren't prominently represented online or in their training

3: Convergence of Specialized and General LLMs

The experiment reveals an unexpected finding: despite one being specialized (RD) and one being general-purpose (Claude), their responses show more similarities in content and overall conclusions than I would have expected.

Factors in Convergence

A couple of factors might explain this convergence:

1. Shared foundational training - Both models likely share substantial portions of their base training data

2. Similar reasoning patterns - The underlying transformer architecture may produce similar reasoning pathways.

   Internet vs. Classical Sources

Discussion: Where does that leave us?

This one experiment raises vital questions about the future relationship between technology and halacha:

1. Democratic access vs. traditional authority - LLMs democratize access to halachic information but bypasses traditional structures

2. Digitization of text- Communities have a strong incentive to digitize their sources for inclusion in the training data…or to negate the premise to begin with and davka NOT put it online and keep knowledge sequestered offline

3. Transparency in training - The need for transparency about which sources shape these AI systems. As mentioned above, would be a great tool for RD, to see/select which sources it’s bringing info from. Also, let’s see the chain of thought.

4. Complementary use - The ideal role of LLMs as adjuncts to, rather than replacements for, human rabbinic authorities. Perhaps a majority of questions can be handled by an LLM while the more difficult questions answered by a human?

As we’ve said before, this is only the beginning of a new era of Jewish text learning. Humans tricked rocks into learning Torah, and we’re left to figure out what that means. More importantly, I may have to go elsewhere for my kulahs/leniencies.